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Abstract  
Football match-fixing in Greece has a relatively long history, however, from the late 
1990s it has been considered as a serious problem for the sport in the country. 
Despite the history of the phenomenon, Greece has only relatively recently been 
identified as one of the hotspots for football match-fixing on an international level. 
Following the recent scandal exposure in 2011, also known as Koriopolis, detailed 
information about numerous matches played in the 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11 
seasons that attracted UEFA’s attention, were brought into the public eye. Soon after, 
legal action was taken against individuals involved in the process, with a number of 
club officials facing lifelong bans from any football related activity, and football clubs 
either relegated or excluded from European competitions and the Super League 
itself for their involvement in the scandal. Following the aforementioned scandal 
exposure, a vast amount of information regarding football match-fixing was made 
available to the public. The aim of the current article is to provide an account of the 
social organisation of football match-fixing in Greece. Additionally, by examining the 
effects of the scandal according to the outcome uncertainty and league imbalance 
theories, the wider implications of match-fixing for the future of the sport are 
discussed. Our account is based on three main sources of data: the telephone 
conversations that were the result of wiretapping by the National Intelligence Agency 
in relation to the latest football match-fixing scandal (of 2011), published media 
sources, and interviews with informed actors from the realm of Greek football. In 
more detail, we will present: (a) the methods and data used for the study; (b) the 
actors involved in match-fixing (direct and indirect, key and secondary actors); (c) the 
process involved in matchfixing. Towards the end of the article we will attempt at 
discussing the findings by locating them within the contemporary football-related and 
non-football-related situation in the country. According to our examination, by the 
time the scandal was exposed, outcome uncertainty within the league had reached 
extreme low levels, causing significant competitive imbalance among the clubs. This 
imbalance did not only lead to the creation of ‘big’ and ‘small’ teams as Szymanski 
and Kesenne (2004) suggest, but also to the formation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs. As 
Schmidt and Berri (2001) explain in their analysis, since the performance on the field 
in professional competitive sports has a direct impact on their financial income, the 
gap between these two groups is affected by the competitive balance or imbalance 
of the league or competition. Likewise, the minimised outcome uncertainty in Greek 
football led to high levels of competitive imbalance within the professional leagues of 
the sport, leading to the creation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs, with the gap between 
these two categories being widened year after year. What our data has shown, is 
that in Greece the presence of ‘mafias’ or ‘mafia-type’ organisations in match-fixing 
is far from the truth. Unsurprisingly, a view of these match-fixing activities as the 
result of robust, continuous and hierarchical predatory organisational structures is 
not accurate. What emerges from this study is that the entities involved in the 
business of match-fixing are networks i.e. fluid and dynamic social systems that 
consist of patterns of relationships among people/actors (Wasserman & Faust 1994). 
Football match-fixing does not require a great degree of sophistication, and 
management of resources or labour. Towards this end, match-fixing networks tend to 
have a naturally defined horizontal ‘structure’. Participants on these networks many 
times act on improvisation such as in the case of the outcome of a match-fixing 
process not being pragmatised by the first half of the match. A number of individuals 
act as intermediaries who bring together disconnected parts (see Morselli & Roy, 
2008) by controlling in a sense all the information asymmetries that make up the 
networks (see Burt, 1992). What merely exist are individuals or small groups forming 
temporary collaborations in order for their shared objective, making profit (or 
ensuring that a club wins which also has financial long-term implications), to 
materialise. Overall, the image of the business that emerges from our examination of 
a series of its aspects from the 2011 scandal does not vindicate the heavy emphasis 
that orthodox accounts of ‘organised crime’ place on characteristics such as rigid 
organisation, coordination, hierarchy and so on. Rather, our findings are consistent 
with views of match-fixing as an organised criminal activity being less robust from an 
organisational viewpoint, carried out by individuals or clusters of individuals that 
assemble on the basis of opportunity rather than authority.  
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